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INTRODUCTION 
Modern organizations have widely adopted the team approach as away of accomplishing tasks that surpass the capabilities of singleindividuals (Glassop, 2002). Teams are viewed as “group(s) of twoor more individuals who must interact cooperatively and adap-
tively in pursuit of shared valued objectives” (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, &
Converse, 1993, p. 223). To achieve team success, team members should
engage in collective actions and restrict individual activities that are incom-
patible with or even contradictory to team objectives. Of the undesirable
behaviors, free-riding has long been argued to be a main obstacle for teams
to achieve quality performance (Anesi, 2009; Kerr, 1983; Olson, 1965; Orbell &
Dawes, 1981; Price, 2006).
Free-riding, also labeled as a social trap (Platt, 1973), commons problem
(Edney, 1980), commons dilemma (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977),
assurance problem (Runge, 1984), social loafing (Karau & Williams, 1993;
Orbell & Dawes, 1981), and moral hazard in teams (Anesi, 2009), refers to an
undesired behavior in which a member of a group obtains benefits from
group membership but does not bear a proportional share of the costs of
providing the benefits (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985). Free-riding deteriorates
team productivity by tempting team members to be free-riders and shirk
from collective actions.
Given free-riding’s role in determining team success, many studies have
been conducted to understand and develop a means to cope with this detri-
mental behavior. Early group and organizational theorists have focused on
the causes of free-riding under the theoretical umbrella of public goods (e.g.,
Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985; Olson, 1965; Orbell & Dawes, 1981; Runge, 1984;
Stroebe & Frey, 1982); experimental studies derived from the prisoner’s
dilemma game (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985; Luce & Raiffa, 1957) and public
goods provisioning (Dawes, 1980) have been conducted to study how group
size, nature of task, individual differences, and work arrangements affect
one’s tendency of free-riding (for a review, see Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985).
Research in this area employs mathematic modeling to examine
reward/sanction systems under which free-riding behaviors can be discour-
aged (e.g., Anesi, 2009; Price, 2006; van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden,
2001). In addition, the advance of information technology opens a new
arena for studying technologies, especially communication technologies, in
affecting people’s behavior in technology-supported team settings (e.g.,
Alnuaimi, Robert, & Maruping, 2010).
However, our understanding of free-riding is still not perfect. With much
attention being placed on explicit means such as group composition, tech-
nologies, and reward/sanction systems, behavioral research that examines
the extent to which cognitive, psychological, social, and cultural factors
affect people’s free-riding tendency is comparatively rare. Albanese and Van
Fleet’s (1985) criticism remains valid today that the research falls short of
clear conclusions regarding what managerial methods can be applied to
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effectively counter the free-riding ten-
dency in project teams.
To fill the research gap, this study
takes a behavioral perspective to exam-
ine the detrimental effects of free-
riding on team performance based on
the recent development of social and
cognitive theories, and investigates
team morale, or the collective task atti-
tudes shared by team members, as a
key factor that counteracts the tenden-
cy of free-riding among team members.
The remainder of the article is
organized as follows. First, a brief liter-
ature review on free-riding, organiza-
tional citizenship behavior (OCB), and
team cognition in social and organiza-
tional behavior is presented, followed
by the proposal of a research model
with team morale and team size as the
antecedents and team cognition and
team performance as the conse-
quences of free-riding. Then, a research
strategy is designed with the use of stu-
dent software development teams as
the research subject. An instrument is
developed to capture salient free-riding
behaviors from team members. After
empirical testing of the research model,
results and implications of the study
are discussed.
Theoretical Foundations and
Hypotheses
This study intends to investigate the
antecedents as well as the conse-
quences of free-riding in team set-
tings. A research model is presented in
Figure 1.
Free-Riding
The notion of free-riding can be back-
dated to the early seminal work of
Olson (1965). Of the large literature on
inefficiencies in collective actions, all
studies point to the free-rider problem
as a main obstacle in achieving the
desired outcomes (Anesi, 2009). The
cause of free-riding is rather intuitive.
Price (2006) summarized the cause as
follows:
If each member receives an equal
share of the benefit that the group
produces, no matter how much that
member contributed to the produc-
tion effort, then each member has a
private incentive to contribute less
than co-members. This incentive to
free-ride exists because if all mem-
bers benefit equally, then the mem-
bers who contributed the least to
production will reap the highest net
benefits. (p. 20)
There are two assumptions about
human nature underlying the above
analysis: (1) people are egoistic so that
personal interests always surpass col-
lective benefits of others, and (2) people
are rational so that they tend to perform
activities whose perceived benefits out-
weigh perceived costs. The assump-
tions are in line with the transaction
cost theory, which presumes that eco-
nomic actors behave with bounded
rationality and self-interest (Simon,
1976; Williamson, 1985), and some are
either opportunistic or untrustworthy
(Williamson, 1985). A central premise
of transaction cost theory is that
“employees will have strong incentives
to shirk (from work) and no incentive to
improve performance unless task 
conditions allow employees to demon-
strate discrete performance contribu-
tions and to obtain the rewards that
accrue from increased performance”
(Jones, 1984, p. 5). As such, people tend
to act selfishly and shirk from assigned
tasks if their behavior cannot be moni-
tored and evaluated in a team envi-
ronment. The literature suggests two 
solutions to the free-rider problem: 
(1) designing reward systems to direct
social benefits toward cooperators and/
or (2) designing sanction systems to
impose social costs on free-riders
(Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Vesterlund,
2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Hawkes,
1993; Price, 2006; Yamagishi, 1986). The
two solutions share a common theme:
reducing the incentive (the difference
between the estimated benefits and
costs) to free-ride in order to encour-
age one’s participation in collective
activities.
However, designing new reward/
sanction systems could be very chal-
lenging, if not intimidating, in many
situations. Especially when tasks are
unique, complex, or ambiguous, stan-
dardized monitoring and merit-reward
systems should be precluded for the
ambiguity of performance evaluation
(Ouchi, 1980). Other approaches need
to be explored to address the free-rider
problem. The research on OCB pro-
vides another perspective on studying
this issue.
Team Morale and Organizational
Citizenship Behavior
People are not always self-centered. An
individual’s behavior in collective
actions is driven not only by rational
calculation of material incentives, but
also by immaterial motivations such as
normative conformity (socially accept-
ed standards of conduct about princi-
pled behavior) and affective bond
(emotional attachments to certain 
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Figure 1: Research model.
Note. Signs indicate a hypothesized effect is positive or negative.
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people and organizations) (Kidwell &
Bennett, 1993; Knoke, 1988). In addi-
tion, researchers have noted the 
existence of altruistic behavior in orga-
nizational settings where people make
voluntary efforts at work beyond pre-
scribed specifications and tasks. Such
behaviors are labeled as organizational
citizenship behaviors (OCBs) in the lit-
erature. OCB that was derived from
Organ’s (1988) work has received the
most research attention (Hoffman,
Blair, Meriac, & Woehr, 2007). According
to Organ (1988), OCB refers to:
individual behavior that is discre-
tionary, not directly or explicitly rec-
ognized by the formal reward sys-
tem, and that in the aggregate pro-
motes the effective functioning of
the organization. By discretionary, I
mean that the behavior is . . . rather
a matter of personal choice, such
that its omission is not generally
understood as punishable. (p. 4)
OCB can be viewed as an extreme
opposite of free-riding behaviors. Free-
riding is driven by personal interests,
while OCB promotes collective benefits
by voluntary activities. OCB research
implies alternative solutions to coun-
teract free-riding without the burden 
of designing new reward/sanction 
systems.
A comprehensive review of the liter-
ature concludes that job attitudes are
robust predictors of OCB (Organ &
Ryan, 1995). Positive job attitudes such
as commitment to work reflect that
employees identify with the organiza-
tion’s values, accept its goals, and are
willing to make significant efforts at
work (J. P. Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001),
and OCB is one of the main conse-
quences that benefits the organization
by promoting efficiency and effective
functioning (Organ, 1988; Organ,
Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). Thus,
organizations are encouraged to main-
tain high morale among the workforce
for favorable behaviors of OCB
(Randall, Cropanzano, Bormann, &
Birjulin, 1999). The positive influence of
job attitudes on OCB has received
strong support from empirical research.
In a study of temporary workers,
researchers find that employees with
strong job commitment and motiva-
tions to taking assignments present
high levels of OCB in client organiza-
tions (Moorman & Harland, 2002). In
another study of self-directed teams,
team commitment was found to be
positively correlated (r  0.4, p  0.001)
with the tendency of OCB (Foote &
Tang, 2008). Although much of the
research is conducted within the US
context, similar results have been con-
cluded from other cultures, including
Australia (Feather & Rauter, 2004),
Korea (Kim, 2006), Spain (Vilela,
González, & Ferrín, 2008), and France
(Paillé, 2010), to name a few.
By definition, the presence of OCB
means the lack of free-riding behaviors.
People who have positive attitudes and
strong commitments about their work
are less likely to be free-riders when
working with their colleagues. In cohe-
sive social networks such as project
teams, people’s perceptions of and atti-
tudes about their assignments are
largely determined by social influence
from peers (Latane, 1981; G. W. Meyer,
1994; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Thus, a
team’s collective attitude about team
tasks will affect individuals’ attitudes,
and therefore their behaviors, about
participating in team actions. The more
positive the collective attitude is about
the tasks, the less likely that team mem-
bers will shirk in team activities and be
free-riders.
Following the work of Lindsay,
Manning, and Petrick (1991), team
morale is defined in the study as the
collective attitudes and shared commit-
ments among members with regard to
their team tasks. Project teams with
high team morale present a strong
sense of shared significance of team
tasks and a commitment to peak per-
formance, and exert persistent social
influence on members, as their team-
mates commonly expect collaborative
behaviors guided by team interests. 
In contrast, members of teams with low
team morale observe weak social influ-
ence and feel limited constraints on
their private behaviors. Kappelman,
McKeeman, and Zhang (2006, p. 34)
note, “Project team members with a
weak commitment to the project scope
and schedule can always find other
worthwhile activities to work on.” In
summary, team morale will counter the
tendency of free-riding in a project
team.
Hypothesis 1: Team morale has a
negative effect on the scale of free-
riding in a team: the higher the team
morale, the less manifest is the free-
riding behavior in the team.
Team Size
Other than team morale, the study
investigates team size as another
antecedent factor that exerts significant
effects on free-riding. Team size can be
viewed as a control variable in the
research model (Figure 1) because it 
(1) serves as a background variable that
describes a distinct aspect (i.e., the
number of members) of investigated
teams and (2) complements the focal
analysis of team morale. Including
background variables as control vari-
ables helps to alleviate the concern of
coverage error and improve the gener-
alizability of the results of empirical
research (King & He, 2005).
Indeed, the effect of team size on
free-riding has long been discussed in
the literature. The free-rider problem is
rooted in the rational comparison
between the expected benefits and esti-
mated costs of free-riding (Olson, 1965;
Price, 2006). The difference, viewed as
an incentive, grows with the number of
people involved in the target collective
action (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985;
Anesi, 2009). Compared with small
groups, individuals in large groups are
more likely to conclude that there is 
no perceptible difference between 
contributing and not contributing,
therefore increasing the tendency of
free-riding (Albanese & Van Fleet,
1985). In addition, large team sizes
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make the interaction between members
more difficult and complex (Riopelle 
et al., 2003), thereby increasing the like-
lihood of free-riding behaviors, espe-
cially in technology-supported teams
(Alnuaimi et al., 2010; Chidambaram &
Tung, 2005). Thus, large teams are
expected to be the most affected by the
free-rider problem.
Hypothesis 2: Team size has a posi-
tive effect on the scale of free-riding
in a team: the larger the team size,
the more manifestis the free-riding
behavior in the team.
Team Cognition and Team
Performance
Team cognition refers to the mental
models collectively held by a group of
individuals that enable them to accom-
plish tasks by acting as a coordinated
unit. This team-level integration of
mental models functions as a mental
template that is imposed on informa-
tion environments to give them form
and meaning, providing a cognitive
foundation for action (Walsh, 1995).
The concept of team cognition has
been proposed as a valid theoretical
lens for examining team interactions
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Cooke,
Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004; Klimoski &
Mohammed, 1994). Effective teams
need to exchange and process informa-
tion and knowledge among team mem-
bers. Such team interactions require
both time and cognitive resources
(MacMillan, Estin, & Serfaty, 2004).
Team cognition enables members to
formulate accurate teamwork and task
work predictions (Cannon-Bowers et al.,
1993; Katz & Tushman, 1979), adapt their
activities and behaviors in a collabora-
tive way, and therefore increase overall
team effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers &
Salas, 2001; Lewis, 2004). Without well-
formed team cognition, team members
will not be able to efficiently share
knowledge and information, coordi-
nate each other’s activities, resolve 
conflicts, or negotiate agreed-upon
solutions (Cannon-Bowers & Salas,
2001; Jackson, May, & Whitney, 1995;
Walsh, 1995).
There are different types of team
cognition (for a review, see Cannon-
Bowers & Salas, 2001). Among them,
team types and task types of team 
cognition are most relevant for team per-
formance (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner,
Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). In a
study of student software development
teams, He, Butter, and King (2007) iden-
tified shared awareness of expertise
location and shared task understanding
as two key dimensions of team cogni-
tion. Shared awareness of expertise
location refers to members’ shared
awareness of other members’ knowl-
edge and expertise in the team; shared
task understanding refers to the mutu-
ally shared understanding of a focal
task among team members.
The development of team cognition
requires frequent interactions among
team members such as communica-
tions and working together (Cooke 
et al., 2004; He et al., 2007; Klimoski &
Mohammed, 1994). Free-riding, howev-
er, impedes the development of team
cognition by inducing individuals to
shirk from collective actions. With
regard to the two main dimensions of
team cognition, the following two
hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 3: The scale of free-riding
has a negative effect on the level of
shared awareness of expertise loca-
tion in a team.
Hypothesis 4: The scale of free-riding
has a negative effect on the level of
shared task understanding in a team.
The team cognition research has
repeatedly observed that teams per-
form better if they have developed
mature team cognition (He et al., 2007;
Hollingshead, 1998; Lewis, 2004; Liang,
Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Moreland &
Myaskovsky, 2000). The empirical evi-
dence supports team cognition as an
important determinant for the effec-
tiveness of working teams (Cannon-
Bowers & Salas, 2001; Mohammed &
Dumville, 2001; Walsh, 1995), although
various mechanisms may exist for dif-
ferent dimensions of team cognition to
affect team performance. More specifi-
cally, shared awareness of expertise
location contributes to better team per-
formance by (1) enabling members to
anticipate, rather than simply react to,
one another’s behavior (Murnighan &
Conlon, 1991); (2) enhancing members’
ability to access one another’s special-
ized expertise, resulting in an expanded
pool of knowledge and expertise for
decision making and problem solving
(Hollingshead, 1998); and (3) allowing
team tasks to be assigned to the people
who are most able to perform them
(Hollingshead, 1998; Moreland &
Myaskovsky, 2000).
Hypothesis 5: The level of shared
awareness of expertise location has a
positive effect on team performance.
In contrast, shared task understand-
ing enhances team performance by
bridging communication gaps that
often exist within a team due to mem-
bers’ different experience backgrounds
and expertise (Abdul-Gader & Kozar,
1990; He et al., 2007). Communication
gaps hinder collaboration in project
teams. The formation of shared task
understanding allows team members to
interpret cues in a similar manner and
make compatible decisions (Klimoski &
Mohammed, 1994; Mohammed &
Dumville, 2001). Therefore, shared task
understanding reduces communication
obstacles and facilitates intragroup
coordination based on shared under-
standing of focal tasks rather than on
the more problematic interpersonal
communication (Vandenbosch &
Higgins, 1996). As a result, team per-
formance will improve due to greater
intragroup coordination.
Hypothesis 6: The level of shared
task understanding has a positive
effect on team performance.
Although team cognition may
strongly mediate the effects of free-riding
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on team performance, previous stud-
ies have not assessed the extent of the
mediation. I propose, as an explorato-
ry study on the issue, that team cogni-
tion partially mediates the negative
effects of free-riding on team perfor-
mance.
Hypothesis 7: The scale of free-riding
has a negative effect on team per-
formance after controlling the effects
of shared awareness of expertise
location and shared task under-
standing.
Research Design
The study selected student software
development teams as the research
subject. Beyond the practical advan-
tage of sampling convenience, the deci-
sion was made mainly for the expected
homogeneity among student back-
grounds, which would lower the risk of
unexpected confounding effects
caused by diversity among ages, experi-
ences, organizational culture, manage-
ment levels, etc.
A synthetic software development
task was designed to test the research
model. Synthetic tasks are “research
tasks constructed by systematic
abstraction from a corresponding real-
world task” (Martin, Lyon, & Schreiber,
1998, p. 123). Performance on a syn-
thetic task should exercise some of the
same behavioral and cognitive skills
associated with the real-world task,
while avoiding the complexity (for
example, the existence of various con-
founding factors that may lower the
opportunity of observing significant
effects of the investigated factors)
encountered in an uncontrolled field
study of real tasks.
The synthetic task employed in this
study was the development of a rela-
tional database system using Microsoft
Access. Except for team formation and
task deadline, participants were free to
set their own schedules and procedures
to carry out their tasks, simulating the
software development process in a real-
istic manner.
Participants
Two hundred and seventy-nine under-
graduates who were enrolled in an
information systems course formed
teams to fulfill a course requirement of
collaboratively developing a relational
database system over a 5-week period.
The demographics of participants are
reported in Table 1.
When the project was assigned, stu-
dents were instructed to form three-
member teams and were allowed to
make their own teammate selections.
Some students selected acquaintances
as teammates, while others chose stu-
dents who happened to be seated near-
by. Eighty-nine teams were formed: 9
teams with two members, 59 teams
with three members, and 21 teams with
four members.
Data Collection
Data were collected from two surveys
distributed at the beginning and the end
of the software development process.
The purpose of designing two surveys
was to reduce possible common-source
bias by separating the measurement of
predictors and dependent variables
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff,
2003). More specifically, participants
were instructed to answer questions
about their team morale during the first
week of the project; just before the 
submission of their work, participants
took the second survey with regard to the
execution of their team tasks, including
team members’ participative activities,
team cognition, and team performance.
Although encouraged by the course
instructor, taking the survey was volun-
tary. Students were told that the survey
responses would not influence their
grades in any way. Some students failed
to answer the survey on time, and some
submitted incomplete answers. This
resulted in 227 usable sets of individual
data for analysis, or an 81% effective
response rate.
Measurement
Free-Riding
So far, free-riding has been studied
largely with mathematical models and
conceptual discussions. In the sporadic
empirical studies, free-riding is often
investigated indirectly by circuitous
observations. For example, Schnake
(1991) assessed task performance, work
motivation, and job satisfaction for
personal efforts in group settings, and
concluded that employees would likely
shirk from team actions if they received
negative social cues that other group
members were withholding or tended
to withhold personal efforts. Taggar 
and Neubert (2008) used observers to
judge the scale of free-riding in a video
of simulated team interaction. In a
study of technology-supported teams,
Alnuaimi and colleagues (2010) mea-
sured the number of ideas generated
per person in a brainstorming team
task as the proxy of free-riding. To my
knowledge, there is no commonly
accepted measure in the literature to
directly assess the scale of free-riding in
team settings.
Unlike other team-level measures
such as team performance, free-riding
is to detect and assess the undesirable
shirking behaviors from few, not all,
team members on assigned team tasks.
Thus, a potential instrument should be
carefully designed to capture the lowest
level, rather than the average level, of
participation among team members.
Gender
Female 143
Male 136
Total 279
Age
18–20 115
21–25 126
26 and up 38
Total 279
Status
Junior 67
Senior 181
Fifth year 31
Total 279
Table 1: Demographics of participants.
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Based on discussion with students as
well as personal experience, I developed
an instrument with two-step questions
to measure the level of the lowest partic-
ipation in teams. Students were first
asked to identify a teammate who had
contributed the least in their teams.
Then, they were asked nine behavioral-
ly anchored questions to assess the par-
ticipation level of the teammate on key
project activities. The activities include
both teamwork (e.g., participating in
team meetings and communicating
with other team members) and task
execution (e.g., contributing ideas and
working on assignments). The rationale
of this design was explained explicitly
on the questionnaire: low levels of par-
ticipation on project activities will be
viewed as free-riding; if the reported
participation of the least-involved
teammate is of high levels, the team will
be assessed with no or little free-riding.
Other Measures
In this study, team morale, team size,
team cognition (including shared
awareness of expertise location and
shared task understanding), and team
performance were measured to test the
research model. Team morale was mea-
sured by a six-item instrument about
members’ attitudes (or the perceived
importance) of their team assignments;
shared awareness of expertise location
and shared task understanding were
each measured by a four-item instru-
ment adopted from He et al. (2007).
Team performance was measured by a
five-item instrument adapted from
Robey, Smith, and Vijayasarathy (1993).
Individual responses of these measures
were averaged within teams to form
team-level data for testing.
These instruments are reported in
the Appendix.
Results
Construct Validity
The test of construct validity was con-
ducted with partial least squares (PLS)—
a structural equation modeling (SEM)
technique that has been commonly
used in information systems (IS)
research. Similar to other SEM tech-
niques (e.g., LISREL), PLS tests the
validity of constructs and the structural
model at the same time, and is therefore
considered methodologically rigorous
when compared with regression-based
techniques that separate the test of
construct validity (e.g., factor analysis)
from the test of the research model
(Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). Two
other distinctive features of PLS made
the technique a particularly suitable
testing tool for this study:
1. PLS has the flexibility of accepting
single-item constructs (i.e., team size
in this study).
2. The algorithm of PLS, which is com-
ponent-based rather than covari-
ance-based, allows the modeling of
formative indicators (Chin, 1998). In
this study, the construct of free-
riding was modeled as formative
indicators based on its conceptuali-
zation and operationalization (ques-
tions asking the performance of a
certain set of activities).
The design of the new instrument of
free-riding suggests the measure be
modeled as a formative indicator in
hypothesis testing. Conventional pro-
cedures used to assess the validity of
reflective constructs (e.g., factor analy-
sis) may not be appropriate for assess-
ing the validity of formative constructs
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001).
In this study, a multitrait-multimethod
(MTMM) method with special modifi-
cation for assessing formative con-
structs (Loch, Straub, & Sherif, 2003)
was used to examine the convergent
and discriminant validity of a new
measure of free-riding. This method is
also practiced in Marakas, Johnson,
and Clay (2007) for the development
of different types of computer self-
efficacy.
In this method, a composite score of
each formative indicator was calculated
based on the sum of products between
its formative items and their associated
weights. The weight represents the
extent to which an item contributes to
the overall value of a latent variable. A
correlation matrix is then calculated
between items of formative constructs
and all constructs under study. To
establish convergent validity, items
should correlate high with items mea-
suring the same construct, and low
with items measuring other constructs.
To establish discriminant validity, items
should correlate high with the assigned
constructs and low with unassigned
ones. Following the guideline, the
resulted correlation matrix was exam-
ined and all the aforementioned rules
were satisfied. Thus, the validity of the
formative construct of free-riding was
concluded.
Assessing the validity of reflective
items follows the conventional practice
based on the examination of construct
reliability, convergent validity, and dis-
criminant validity. Construct validity
can be assessed by composite reliability
calculated in PLS (should be larger than
0.70). Convergent validity can be
assessed by the average variance extract-
ed (AVE) among measures (should be
larger than 0.50). Discriminant validity
can be assessed by comparing the
square root of AVEs and interconstruct
correlations—the former should be
larger than the latter to support discrim-
inant validity. Close examination of
Table 2 suggested that all the conditions
were satisfied. Thus, validity of the
reflective indicators under study was
concluded.
Hypothesis Testing
The research model was tested with
PLS-Graph 3.0. Examination of the
resulted statistics (path coefficients and
their associated p-values) suggested
that:
• H1 received strong support from the
data sample. H1 hypothesizes that
team morale has a negative effect on
the scale of free-riding behavior in a
team. The negative effect was found to
be large in magnitude (b  0.567)
and strong in significance (p  0.001,
two-sided).
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• H2 received marginal support from
the data sample. H2 predicts that
free-riding will be more manifest in
large teams than that in small teams.
The positive effect of team size on 
the scale of free-riding was found to
be moderately small (b  0.17) and
marginally significant (p  0.072,
two-sided).
• H3 and H4 both received strong sup-
port from the data sample. The two
hypotheses propose that free-riding
has negative effects on team cognition
in terms of shared awareness of exper-
tise location (H3) and shared task
understanding (H4). The negative
effects were found to be large in mag-
nitude (b  0.561 for H3 and b 
0.570 for H4) and strong in signifi-
cance (both with p  0.001, two-sided).
• H5 and H6 also received strong sup-
port from the data sample. The two
hypotheses propose that team cogni-
tion, measured by shared awareness
of expertise location (H5) and shared
task understanding (H6), exerts posi-
tive effects on team performance.
Both path coefficients were found to
be substantial (b  0.538 for H5 and 
b  0.314 for H6) with distinct statisti-
cal significance (p  0.001 for H5 and
p  0.01 for H6, two-sided).
• H7 did not receive support from the
data sample. H7 states that free-riding
presents a negative effect on team
performance after controlling the
effects of two key elements of team
cognition (i.e., shared awareness of
expertise location and shared task
understanding). The hypothesized
effect was found to be negligible (b 
0.07, p  0.478), suggesting that in
the research sample team cognition
fully mediated the influence of free-
riding on team performance.
Overall, testing results lent strong
support to the proposed research
model. Most relationships were con-
cluded with hypothesized directions
and statistical significance; in addition,
about 34% variance of free-riding and
63% variance of team performance
were explained by the model. These sta-
tistics demonstrate good model fit
(Gefen et al., 2000). The testing results
are summarized in Figure 2.
Summary and Discussion
Summary of the Findings
There is little doubt that free-riding
exerts deteriorating effects on collective
actions. But to what extent does free-
riding impair team performance? Data
from the sampled student software
development teams shows that the nega-
tive effect of free-riding on team per-
formance is considerably large (r 
0.475, p  0.001). Such an effect is fully
mediated by team cognition (measured
by shared awareness of expertise loca-
tion and shared task understanding).
This finding suggests that the free-rider
problem impairs team performance by
impeding the development of collective
mental models among team members.
In this study, both team size and
team morale were measured at the
Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Team morale 0.97 0.926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Team size 1 0.060 1 . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Free-ridinga – 0.557 0.136 . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Expertise location 0.96 0.421 0.150 0.561 0.922 . . . . . .
5. Task understanding 0.95 0.491 0.141 0.570 0.746 0.907 . . .
6. Team performance 0.96 0.480 0.234 0.475 0.769 0.712 0.902
Note. Reliability: composite reliability is calculated in PLS. Numbers in bold on the leading diagonal are the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) among
reflective measures. For discriminant validity of constructs, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements. Off-diagonal elements are correlations 
among constructs.
aFree-riding is modeled as formative indicators in the study. Calculations of construct reliability and shared variance are not relevant for the construct.
Table 2: Interconstruct correlations.
–0.570***
(p  0.072)
Free-Riding
R2  0.339
Team
Performance
R2  0.634
Task
Understanding
Expertise
Location
Team
Morale
Team
Size
0.170
(p  0.478)
0.07
–0.567*** –0.561***
0.538***
0.314**
Figure 2: Testing results.
Note. Dashed lines indicate insignificance with p  0.10 (two-sided).
*p  0.05. **p  0.01. ***p  0.001 (two-sided).
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beginning of the software development
process when research participants
formed their teams for the target proj-
ect. As expected, team morale was
found to be negatively associated with,
and team size was positively associated
with, the scale of free-riding in the sam-
pled teams. This result suggests that
enhancing team morale and reducing
team size are two effective means for
counteracting the free-riding tendency
among team members. The two means
can be carefully applied to project
management during early stages of
project development before the com-
mitment of significant resources.
One appropriate situation to
enhance team morale will be the kick-
off meeting for a new project. Starting a
project with a kick-off meeting is a
common project management prac-
tice. The main purpose of the first team
meeting is to clearly understand team
tasks (Wright, 2009), assign roles and
responsibilities (West, 2004), and create
and maintain effective working rela-
tionships among team members
(Bandow, 2001). This study suggests
that enhancing team morale should be
another valuable pursuit of the meet-
ing. High team morale helps to counter
the propensity of free-riding in future
team activities, and therefore increas-
es the chance for the team to achieve
quality performance. Thus, the meet-
ing agenda should place special
emphasis on members’ attitudes toward
team tasks. Means such as helping
team members to realize that their
goals are entwined with that of the
team should be highly advocated to
motivate work teams (Gowen, 1985) for
high levels of team morale.
In the study, the effect of team size
was concluded to be of marginal signif-
icance (p  0.072 in Figure 2), suggest-
ing that reducing team size could be
another effective method of counter-
acting free-riding. However, team size
is often determined by project scale
and therefore difficult to be manipulat-
ed. For example, in the development of
complex information systems, project
execution typically requires knowledge
and experience from many domains
(Curtis, Krasner, & Iscoe, 1988; Faraj &
Sproull, 2000), leading to an inevitable
use of large project teams. One feasible
solution will be to divide a large project
into parts featured by product func-
tions, features, or subsystems, and
employ small workgroups to work on
these parts in a coordinated fashion.
This approach has been successfully
practiced in the development of com-
plex software at Microsoft (Cusumano,
1997) and is a key element of Agile
methodologies that have received
increasing attention, especially in infor-
mation systems development (Nerur,
Mahapatra, & Mangalaraj, 2005). Major
challenges to the approach include
coordination among workgroups and
integration test of the final product
(Sangwan & Laplante, 2006). In addi-
tion to the merits of dealing with proj-
ect uncertainties (caused by dynamic
project environment, evolving tech-
nologies and development tools,
and/or changing user requirements)
and speeding up the project develop-
ment process (Nerur et al., 2005), the
approach of employing small work-
groups should be advocated for its
potential of counteracting the free-riding
tendency among team members. This
will be particularly effective in large
project teams where free-riding exerts a
severe threat to team performance due
to the diluted attention on individual
participation.
Suggestions to Future Research
Due to the scope of the research, other
means for counteracting free-riding
behaviors were not investigated. One of
such means may be an individual’s
identification with his or her working
team. Individuals can identify with
multiple actors (organizations, unions,
supervisors, committees, siblings), and
their behavioral choices are dependent
upon the strength of their identification
with each of these actors (Brickson,
2000). The stronger one’s identification
with a team, the more committed the
person will be toward the team’s objec-
tives (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999),
and therefore the less likely the person
will shirk from collective actions. This
will be a promising area for future
research on free-riding.
The study does not investigate team
leadership, another important means
of counteracting free-riding behaviors
in project teams. Empirical evidence
has repeatedly demonstrated that lead-
ership plays a key role in regulating
team behavior and directing task exe-
cution toward satisfactory outcomes
(Carte, Chidambaram, & Becker, 2006;
Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010).
However, leadership research has paid
little attention to free-riding. A com-
mon view of team leadership is that of
“. . . leader as completer . . . the best a
leader can do is to observe which func-
tions are not being performed by a seg-
ment of the group and enable this part
to accomplish them” (Schutz, 1961, 
p. 61). The theory of transformational
leadership also emphasizes the role of
team leaders in shaping members’ col-
lective behavior by inspiring commit-
ment and sacrifice for the group
(Burns, 1978). Thus, effective team
leaders are expected to restrain and
eliminate free-riding behaviors among
team members, but practical guide
lines that managers can follow are rare
in the literature (Albanese & Van Fleet,
1985). It must be desirable for future
research to investigate the role of team
leadership in counteracting free-riding.
Such research will enrich our under-
standing of team leadership and pro-
vide strong implications for the 
practice of project management.
Another interesting area for future
research could be the effects of demo-
graphics on free-riding. The literature
on team diversity suggests that the dis-
tribution of demographics such as eth-
nicity, age, and gender may influence
one’s behavior in work teams. In a study
of team cognition in software develop-
ment teams, mixed-gender teams were
found to develop higher levels of team
cognition than that of single-gender
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teams (He et al., 2007). Distinct behav-
ioral patterns induced by team diversity
may exist in the phenomenon of free-
riding. The demographics of participat-
ing students are reported in Table 1.
However, due to the scope of study,
team diversity effects were not investi-
gated. Future research needs to clarify
the issue.
The research model does not include
a time variable, which has recently
received increased attention in IS
research (Sarker & Sahay, 2004; Saunders,
2007). The team literature has long rec-
ognized the influence of time on team
behavior (Tuckman, 1965; Wheelan &
Hochberger, 1996). For example, the
team transition model (Gersick, 1989)
argues that the urgency of deadlines
helps teams alternate the inertia in team
behaviors and themes through which
they approach their work. As time pass-
es, the awareness of deadlines will alert
team members to the necessity of adjust-
ing their behaviors to assure the project
is completed on schedule. Thus, one may
expect that team morale will increase,
and free-riding will decrease, with the
progress of the project.
To clarify the issue, additional sur-
veys were distributed during the five-
week project development period.
Every week, participants were asked the
same questions of team morale and
free-riding in their teams. The results
are summarized in Table 3.
The results suggest insignificant
correlations between the time of mea-
surement and the scales of team morale
and free-riding (p-values are 0.456 and
0.657, respectively). The previously
mentioned time effects were not
observed in the sampled teams. Future
research is needed to clarify the effect
of time on team morale and free-riding.
Limitations of the Study
Although the results are encouraging,
the study has several limitations. One is
about the measurement of free-riding.
Free-riding was measured by a new
instrument rather than an existing
measure from the literature. Viewing
free-riding as lack of participation in
team settings, the instrument adopts a
formative measurement approach and
employs a set of behavior-anchored
questions to assess the scale of free-
riding. The development of the new
instrument can be viewed as a contri-
bution to the field; however, the validity
of the new instrument needs to be test-
ed with confirmatory analysis such as
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in
future research.
Another limitation is the low vari-
ance among the sizes of teams being
investigated in the study. The sampled
teams had two, three, or four members in
each team, while in actual projects the
use of large teams with dozens of mem-
bers is not rare. Although a natural lim-
itation of experimental study, the
results of the current research do reveal
the effect of team size on free-riding.
The conclusion needs further empirical
support, especially from field studies
conducted in real business settings.
All the constructs except team size
were self-reported by participating stu-
dents. Thus, common method bias
could be another concern for the study.
By aggregating individual responses 
to form team-level measures, this 
concern may be alleviated in that mul-
tiple responses could cancel out each
other’s errors. To assess the extent of
common method variance, I performed
Harman’s single-factor test by loading
all of the items in this study into an
exploratory factor analysis. Although
the Harman method is a widely used
diagnostic technique, Podsakoff and
colleagues (Podsakoff et al., 2003) criti-
cized it for its ambiguity about the
source of the variance extracted by a
single factor. The extracted variance
from the single factor could be caused
by the use of a common method, lack of
discriminant validity, and/or the exis-
tence of causal relationships among the
investigated constructs.
To assess the source of the extracted
variance, I performed two Harman’s
single-factor tests with the objective
measure of team size included and
excluded, respectively. With team size
included, an emerged single factor
explained 36.81% of the covariance
among the measures. With team size
excluded, the variance extracted from a
single factor increased to 37.95%. The
trivial difference (about 1.1% of the
total variance) provides strong evi-
dence that there is no substantial com-
mon method variance present.
As this was an experimental study,
student teams were selected as the
research subject. Thus, special caution
is needed when applying the findings to
teams of other settings. Student teams
differ from other teams in many ways.
For example, the incentive systems are
Team Morale Free-Riding
Mean Std. Scalea Std.
Time of Week 1 4.22 0.47 0.68 1.40
Measurement
Week 2 4.25 0.60 0.62 1.27
Week 3 4.21 0.43 0.52 1.20
Week 4 4.23 0.54 0.41 1.50
Week 5 4.33 0.42 0.63 1.19
Correlation With Time 0.063 0.037
aFree-riding is modeled as formative indicators in the study; its scale is calculated using path weights of each
measurement item calculated in PLS.
Table 3: Time effects on team morale and free-riding.
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weak in student teams because of the
lack of severe consequence of poor per-
formance; but in real business settings,
failing to meet coworkers’ expectations
is likely to affect the prosperity of one’s
career. Also, the sampled student teams
involve no geographically distributed
participants, and team communication
relies mainly on face-to-face meetings
and e-mails, while companies are
increasingly adopting virtual teams
enabled by the development of group
communication technologies (Bjørn &
Ngwenyama, 2009). Future research is
desired to test the generalizability of
the findings in various contexts. 
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Appendix
Free-Riding (a Two-Step Measure)
Step 1: Recall the whole project devel-
opment process. Select a member who
has contributed to the project the least
in your group (other than you). Note: if
the person you selected has con-
tributed a lot (as reflected in the next
set of questions), it means that every-
one has worked hard on this project
and there is no free-rider on your team.
Step 2: Do you agree with the fol-
lowing statements regarding the per-
son’s contribution to the project?
1. The person did NOT participate in
group meetings.
2. The person did NOT communicate
with other members.
3. The person could NOT be reached by
e-mail or telephone.
4. The person did NOT take responsi-
bility for his/her part of the project
development.
5. The person did NOT contribute any
creative ideas to the project.
6. The person did provide meaningful
suggestions/advice to the project.
7. The person’s knowledge has great sig-
nificance to this project.
8. Compared with my efforts, I think the
person has contributed significantly
to the group project.
9. Overall, the person has contributed a
lot to this project.
Team Morale (a Collective Measure of
Attitudes Toward Team Assignments)
Do you agree that you and your fellow
members believe . . .
1. This assignment is important to all
team members.
2. Everyone should work hard on this
assignment.
3. Everyone should commit heavily to
this assignment.
4. Nobody should “escape” from doing
the assignment.
5. Teamwork is important to your
group’s success.
6. People should work closely to get the
job done.
Shared Awareness of Expertise
Location
Do your team members know each
other’s skills and expertise . . .
1. The team had a good “map” of each
other’s talents and skills.
2. Team members were assigned to
tasks commensurate with their task-
relevant knowledge and skill.
3. Team members knew what task-
related skills and knowledge they
each possess.
4. Team members knew who on the
team has specialized skills and knowl-
edge that is relevant to their work.
Shared Task Understanding
Do you agree with the following state-
ments?
1. Team members had a common
understanding of the application
domain (i.e., inventory manage-
ment) that the system was supposed
to support.
2. Team members had a common
understanding of the technologies
used in the development process.
3. Team members had a common
understanding of the project devel-
opment procedures.
4. Overall, team members shared their
visions of the project.
Team Performance
Please evaluate performance of the
project team in the past one week
regarding . . .
1. The amount of work the team pro-
duced.
2. The efficiency of team operations.
3. The team’s adherence to the schedule.
4. The quality of work the team pro-
duced.
5. The effectiveness of the team’s inter-
actions with people outside the team.
